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Resumen: Los productores agrícolas responden a las regulaciones 
ambientales ajusfando sus prácticas de producción a 
través de la minimización de sus pérdidas de ingreso 
esperado. Esencialmente, el costo de regular el medio 
agrícola está determinado por los ajustes que se tienen 
que hacer a nivel de productor. Nuestra estructura de 
simulación a este nivel evalúa los efectos económicos y 
ambientales de restricciones hipotéticas en el uso de 
pesticidas en un contexto donde continúan los esfuerzos 
de conservación del suelo. 
Abstract: Farmers respond to environmental regulations by ad-
justing production practices so as to comply while min-
imizing their loss in expected income. Ultimately the 
cost of agro-environmental regulation is determined by 
farm-level adjustments. Our farm-level simulation 
framework assesses economic and environmental im-
pacts of hypothetical pesticide restrictions in the context 
of continuing soil conservation efforts. 
1. Introduction 
Nonpoint source pollution efforts in U.S. agricultural policy historical-
ly have emphasized voluntary control of soil erosion and surface 
runoff. Not all water quality problems fit neatly into this focus, 
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however. The detection of agricultural chemicals in groundwater has 
raised much concern, for example. In their nationwide well survey, the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency reports the detection of pes-
ticide residues in about ten percent of the community wells and four 
percent of the private wells surveyed (USEPA 1991; USEPA 1994). With 
the onset of additional pollution concerns in agriculture comes the 
need for analytical tools to assess the costs of controlling the multi-
dimensional problem. 
The cost of agricultural nonpoint source pollution control is dif-
ficult to determine when (1) control of one pollutant can result in 
the release of others, or (2) instead of being controlled, pollutants can 
be shifted to different environmental media. In addition to limiting the 
burden on farmers, policy makers also must contend with possibly 
opposing environmental goals, such as soil conservation and the reduc-
tion of pesticide applications. The physical linkage of surface and 
groundwater systems and air quality provides a setting for another 
example of conflicting environmental goals, since it suggests that policy 
analysis needs to address surface and ground water quality, and air 
quality as well. Many researchers have considered restriction on pes-
ticides (Lichtenberg et al., 1988; Anderson et al., 1985), sedimentation 
(Kramer et al., 1983; Braden et al, 1989), or nutrients (Park and Shab-
man, 1982; Johnson et al, 1991), but without attempting to limit such 
intermedia effects. 
Another complication in costing environmental control in agricul-
ture is that regulatory burden on farmers can come in the form of 
increased risk bearing. New restrictions on land and chemical use would 
create additional variability in revenue and input supplies, as well as 
new input costs. Uncertainty in farm income and farmer's attitudes 
toward risk add to the cost of alternative production practices, or 
management systems, needed to meet environmental goals (Collins and 
Headley, 1983; Ervin, 1982; and Kramer et al., 1983). Usually, re-
searchers have given joint rather than separate consideration to farmers' 
attitudes toward variation in income and soil loss. 
This paper captures these important elements of the agricultural 
water quality problem. Because the burden of new pesticide regulations 
depends on farmers' ability to substitute out of more costly inputs and 
less profitable outputs (Kramer et al, 1983), we adopt a farm-level 
analytical framework. We consider farm-level decisions with a quad-REDUCING ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION  165 
ratic programming model of a typical, 121.4 hectare (300 acre) cash 
grain farm in the U.S. western cornbelt (i.e., Missouri, Illinois and Iowa). 
The model is comprehensive in limiting soil loss and pesticide loadings 
to the air, surface runoff, and leachate below the root zone. To con-
sider risk, we use a stochastic simulator to generate separate probabilis-
tic parameters for soil loss and net income that reflect the added 
production risk of regulation. These parameters are input for the quad-
ratic programming model. 
We use the quadratic programming model to consider two sets of 
issues. First, how do the level of risk aversion and the probability of meeting 
the soil loss goals influence farmer income and the choice of manage-
ment systems? Second, how will the farmer respond to conservation 
and environmental regulations? Here we relate farmer income and the 
choice of management systems to restrictions on soil loss and pesticide 
loadings. By assessing the farmer's possible response to risk and 
resource use restrictions, we hope to gain a clearer picture of the cost of 
managing multi-dimensional environmental problems caused by 
agriculture. 
2. Analytical Framework 
2.1. Overview 
Policy makers want to achieve environmental goals while minimizing the 
regulatory burden on the farming community. More stringent regulation 
of inputs and production practices generally, but not always, will have a 
detrimental effect on farming profitability; the magnitude of that effect, 
however, is a matter of contentious debate. What is needed is a rigorous 
assessment of the profitability of alternative management systems. An 
extensive literature exists on the comparative economics of alternative 
agricultural production systems (e.g., Shortle and Miranowski, 1987; and 
Taylor and Frohberg, 1977; for a review, see Fox et al., 1991). Our 
contribution is our separate treatment of different types of risk and 
our control of intermedia pollutant transfers. 
The policy assessment should faithfully represent the productive 
capabilities of alternative management systems. In most cases, risk 
should be considered, because of randomness in prices, yields, and 166 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
resource availability, and because numerous studies have demonstrated 
that farmers are risk averse (e.g., Binswanger, 1980; Dillon and Scan-
dizzo, 1978). The farmer often is willing to sacrifice some income, on 
average, for security and will select a portfolio of enterprises. Farmers' 
regulatory burden ultimately depends on their flexibility in portfolio 
management, substituting out of regulated inputs and into more 
profitable outputs (Kramer et al., 1983). The policy assessment should 
also consider the transport of pollutants to environmental media and the 
chemical transformations the pollutants undergo during transport. To 
inform policy makers on the merits of alternative strategies, researchers 
must appropriately characterize environmental and farm production 
systems so that hypothetical policy changes can be accurately trans-
formed into economic and environmental outcomes. 
In our research we have used a simulation framework having two 
components. The first is the Stochastic Soil Conservation Economics 
model (SSOILEC), which is a stochastic, dynamic farm production 
simulator developed by the University of Illinois Department of 
Agricultural Economics (Setia and Johnson, 1988). SSOILEC used site-
specific physical and economic data to generate parameters for the 
second component of the simulation, a quadratic programming model 
(QP). SSOILEC yielded means and covariances for net income and soil 
loss for each management system. The QP determined optimal combina-
tions of management systems under various regulatory scenarios (i.e., 
soil loss and pesticide restrictions). An USEPA study (Donigian et al., 
1986) provided pesticides fate and transport data for the QP. The QP 
maximizes net income under risk, subject to desired reductions in soil 
loss and potential pesticide loadings to air, surface runoff, and leachate 
below the root zone. 
2.2. Simulated and Historical Data 
We selected the 24 management systems most prevalent in the study area: 
two crop rotations (continuous corn and corn-soybeans), three tillage 
systems (conventional tillage, reduced tillage, no-till), and four mecha-
nical control practices (vertical plowing, contouring, stripcropping, and 
contouring and terracing). A stochastic simulator (SSOILEC) calculated the 
impact of sheet and rill erosion on soil productivity and production costs. 
It consists of four basic relationships: the universal soil loss equation REDUCING ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION  167 
(USLE), discounted net returns, and the relationships between crop yield 
and soil loss and between production costs and soil loss, SSOILEC linked 
physical and economic information for each management system over 
the 25-year planning horizon to capture the intertemporal nature of 
soil loss. 
To simulate effects of soil erosion on net returns over time and 
under different soil management systems, we gathered field data from 
four experimental farms operated by the University of Illinois' Depart-
ment of Agronomy, which were reviewed and approved by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture's Extension Service in Illinois. Our data 
describe a typical farm in the u s. western cornbelt and include the 
following factors: annual production costs for each system, specific to 
this region and the soil types; USLE factors; production cost and crop 
yield adjustments for mechanical control practices; crop yield adjust-
ments for tillage effects; crop residue production; 30-year (1957-1986) 
historical joint probability distributions' (for commodity prices, crop 
yields, and weather); and confidence level parameters and safety in-
come level (Baumol, 1963; Boussard and Petit, 1967). These data repre-
sent typical values for the region's farms. For a detailed description of 
SSOILEC and our data sources, see Setia and Johnson (1988) and 
Venkataraman (1988). SSOILEC calculated annualized net returns for 
each management system with a real discount rate of 8 percent and 
25-year planning horizon.
2 
There are at least four possible sources of uncertainty in our model: 
crop yields, weather (i.e., the USLE 7?-factor, a measure of rainfall as it 
affects erosion), crop prices and production costs. Reasonable assump-
tions about these sources of variation allowed us to simplify our model-
ing framework. First, we assume production costs to be constant and 
known at the time of planting. Second, we assume no correlation be-
tween crop yields and prices, since the latter are determined on the 
world level, while yields are site specific. Third, we assume no correla-
1 To correct for an upward bias due to inflation and technological change, the varíate 
difference method was used to detrend the data. This method allows the mathematically 
predictable expected components of the data to be removed and the variances and 
covariances calculated on the residual random component of the data (Tintner, 1940). This 
approach assumes that predictable components of the data do not contribute to risk. 
2 We used a range of discount rates, from 4 to 10 percent. We do not report here the 
results from discount rates other than 8 percent, because the change influenced income 
levels but not our principle interest, the pattern of management systems adopted. 168 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
tion between crop yields and the ^-factor. While rainfall often will 
not affect yields because of the time of year it is delivered, it almost 
certainly will affect soil loss considerably in the USLE (Setia and 
Johnston, 1988). 
One notable complication did arise: the stochastic nature of 
weather, crop prices, and crop yields causes net returns to be random as 
well. Because the stochastic variables interrelate in a multiplicative 
manner (e.g., price * yield = gross returns), it is difficult to directly 
predict their effect on variability in net returns. Monte Carlo analysis 
overcame this prediction problem. We ran the simulator repeatedly by 
randomly sampling from the joint probability distributions of the 
stochastic variables (weather, crop yields, and crop prices), generating a 
distribution of outputs (net returns) reflecting conditions at the farm 
(Rubinstein, 1981; Setia and Johnson, 1988). Theoretically, an in-
finite number of observations needs to be generated by this method. 
However, we ceased our simulations after 700 runs when the results 
stabilized, i.e., additional observations did not influence mean and 
variance values. 
Lastly, we were fortunate enough to find information about pes-
ticide loadings that met our needs. An essential part of this research was 
fate and transport information reliable and simple enough to be included 
in our QP. The potential pesticide loadings to different environmental 
media (air, surface runoff, and leached below the root zone) for each 
management system were provided by an EPA pesticide fate and 
transport modeling analysis (Donigian et al, 1986). This study used the 
physical process models PRZM and AT123D to generate linear loading 
coefficients for nine pesticides and takes into account the effect of 
weather, pesticide and soil characteristics, tillage practices, and crops 
(Pesticide Root Zone Modeling System, Carsel 1986; Analytical Tran-
sient One-, Two-, Three-Dimensional Simulation of Waste Treatment in 
the Aquifer System, Yeh, 1986). PRZM models pesticide mass loadings 
to leachate, runoff, and volatilization as a function of pesticide proper-
ties, meteorological conditions, soil and crop characteristics, tillage 
practices, and application rates. AT123D uses the PRZM predictions of 
leachate loadings to model solute transport in aquifer systems, giving 
pesticide concentrations in groundwater. A detailed description of the 
analytical framework used to estimate the pesticide loadings coef-
fients is given in Donigian et al. (1986). REDUCING ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION 169 
2.3. Economic Optimization Model 
Thus far we have assembled data and parameters to characterize produc-
tion and environmental systems. What remains is our specification of the 
farmer's decision analysis. The farmer will rank farm plans on the basis 
of their income distributions. Several alternatives exists for such a rank-
ing. The most established decision theory in economics is expected 
utility theory, as developed by von Neuman and Morgenstern (1944). The 
conceptual appeal of this approach derives from its reliance on a set of 
behavioral axioms rather than a particular functional form. However, 
the theoretical generality of the expected utility approach comes at the 
expense of computational ease, particularly when looking at multiple 
risky assets. Anderson, Dillon, and Hardaker (1977) review the attempts 
to use the axioms of expected utility theory to elicit individual utility 
functions. A more practical approach is to assume a computationally 
convenient functional form, and mean-variance (EV) analysis as 
developed by Markowitz (1959) is one means for doing so. The EV 
approach assumes that the farmer's preferences among alternative farm 
plans are based on the expected value and variance of the income 
associated with those plans. For a more detailed discussion of expected 
utility theory and mean-variance analysis, see Hazell and Norton (1986) 
or Anderson, Dillon, and Hardaker (1977). 
We solve our EV model using QP to analyze farm production 
decisions under various regulatory scenarios
3 (see Robison and Brake 
(1979) for a review of EV model applications to agriculture). Farmers' 
regulatory burden depends on their ability to substitute out of regulated 
inputs and into more profitable outputs (Kramer et al, 1983). Our QP 
allows the farmer to select the ex ante most profitable, fixed input/out-
put combinations (i.e., management systems). Regulatory burden also 
depends on the farmer's risk preferences. Alternative management sys-
3 To use the EV model we assumed an exponential value function to approximate the 
farmer's utility function, which implies constant absolute risk aversion, and normally 
distributed earnings, which we confirmed for our simulations with the chi-square goodness 
of fit test (a = 0.025). In place of these two assumptions, we could have used a quadratic 
utility function but did not because of its diminishing marginal utility of income and 
increasing absolute risk aversion properties. These assumptions underlying EV make it 
less general than expected utility models, but also much easier to solve: maximizing our 
mean-variance objective function is equivalent to maximizing the expected value of the 
utility function (Freund, 1956). 170 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
terns require capital and specialized management skills; income risk 
posed by regulation and farmers' attitudes toward that risk influence 
adoption as they would any investment decision (Collins and Headley, 
1983; Ervin, 1982; and Kramer et al, 1983). 
The QP has the following structure. In the objective function (1), 
discounted expected returns (y) are the difference between expected net 
income and the variance of net income, weighted by the risk aversion 
parameter (<&). Ideally, the variance term should be based on the 
decision maker's subjective assessment of the relevant risks, although 
this has rarely been done (Lin et ai, 1974, is an exception). Instead, 
we use our objective measure of variability and assume the farmer 
bases his/her plans on the mean and variance of a historical series of 
returns. For the atrazine ban simulation, the adjustment factor adj 
adjusts total expected returns for yield loss and increased input costs 
(Osteen and Kuchler, 1986); in all other runs of the model this factor 
was set to zero. 
The first constraint (2) requires the total number of hectares planted 
in each land (i.e., soil characteristics) group (x) not to exceed available 
hectares (Lp. The farm we consider is comprised of land groups in the 
same proportion as exists for the western cornbelt, according to the 
1982 National Resources Inventory. We considered land groups 
Flanagan, Grundy, Tama, Clinton, Ridgeville, Drummer, and Fayette. 
The second constraint (3) is the deterministic form of a chance 
constraint on soil loss. The probability of the expected soil loss exceed-
ing the erosion limit (SL
U) must be less than a. We convert the 
probabilistic soil loss constraint to deterministic form by changing a to 
D, the standardized normal value associated with an a probability that 
soil loss will not be greater than SL
U (Chames and Cooper, 1959).
4 
Since D is positive for risk averse decision makers, the effect of risk in 
soil loss is to increase resource usage per unit of activity (Segarra et al., 
1985). In our model, that means switching to less erosive management 
practices, but ones that also offer lower net income. 
4 Some evidence suggests that rain fall, and thus soil loss, is log normally distributed 
(Wischmeier and Smith, 1978). Our assumption is that, with our large sample (700 samples 
of n = 30), the central limit theorem holds, so that the sample means are normally 
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The third constraint (4) restricts pesticide loadings to the environ-
ment.
5 It requires that the sum of the number of hectares planted (x) 
times the potential pesticide loadings coefficients (PS) be less than a 
specified standard (PS
U), for leaching below the root zone, surface 
runoff, and volatilization. The farmer chooses pesticides and manage-
ment systems simultaneously and may use any pesticide with any sys-
tem. However, the amount of a given pesticide used with a particular 
management system is fixed. In our simulated atrazine ban, we adjust 
the objective function for the increased input costs and diminished 
yields from using substitutes (Osteen and Kuchler, 1986). For the other 
policies pesticides enter the farmer's decisions through this constraint 
only. In all cases, the farmer must use more of the less effective sub-
stitutes to achieve the same effect and in doing so may increase pes-
ticide loadings to the environment. If so, s/he may also have to shift to 
less chemical intensive management systems. 
Lastly, the fourth constraint (5) requires non-negativity of the 
choice variables (JC). The QP maximizes expected returns subject to 
constraints on land usage, soil loss, and pesticide loadings: 
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5 We restrict pesticide loadings, rather than applications, even though this would be 
difficult if not impossible to enforce in practice. We do so as a modeling expedient, 
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watershed) a regulator would be able infer application rates from our parameter values and 
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Where 
ac//'m t is the adjustment to expected net returns for the atrazine ban 
(=Owhennoatrazineban), 
D is a standardized normal value associated with an a probability, 
L" is upper bound on available land, 
PSm. e,;, are pesticide loadings, 
PSi are the upper bounds on pesticide loadings, 
Rm\ is expected net income, 
SLm s. is the expected soil loss, 
SL»' is the upper bound on soil loss, 
xm v is land planted, 
y "' is risk adjusted or expected net income, 
O is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion, and 
a
2 and o
2 are covariance matrices for income (r) and soil loss (s). 
3. Results and Discussion 
To assess the impact of possible pesticide restrictions, we investigated 
two sets of issues with the QP. First, how are farm income and manage-
ment system choices affected by the level of risk aversion toward income 
and by the probability of meeting the soil loss goals? Second, how do 
farm income and management system choices respond to soil loss and 
potential pesticide loadings restrictions? 
To look at the two sets of issues we performed four simulations. In 
the first three simulations we accumulated, one by one, the land, soil 
loss, and pesticide constraints to see the additional net income and en-
vironmental effects of each. In other words, the three runs included the 
following constraints: land; land and soil loss; land, soil loss, and 
pesticides. In the fourth simulation we considered two different REDUCING ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION 173 
kinds of pesticide restrictions. In the first (Status Quo), we restricted 
potential pesticide loadings to be no greater than what would occur 
without the soil loss constraint, while requiring those leached below 
the root zone to reduce by 20%; the objective was to reduce leaching in the 
context of soil conservation measures. The second scenario is a ban on 
atrazine, which induces substitution of other herbicides, such as cyanazine. 
The simulations illustrate some differences in farmers' responses to risk 
in income and soil loss; they also demonstrate some tradeoffs inherent in 
managing multi-dimensional agro-environmental problems. 
3.1. Simulation One: Land Constraint Only 
Table 1 shows how expected returns and the choice of management 
system vary as the level of risk aversion (O) increases.
6 At higher levels 
of <D, the farmer chooses a larger number of management systems, indicat-
ing the expected enterprise diversification to reduce variability of net 
income. Because the settings for this parameter are somewhat arbitrary, 
we selected a wide range of values to evaluate a broad range of possible 
farmer attitudes. Following Kramer et al. (1983), Tauer (1986), and 
Boggess and Ritchie (1988), we selected a range from 0 (risk neutral) to 
0.002 (very high risk aversion).
7 Expected net income varied by 20% 
over this range, confirming the breadth of our range of settings. 
Management systems involving a corn-soybean rotation are 
preferred because of the higher expected value and lower variance of 
net income. However, these systems cause soil loss to be far greater 
than the tolerance level (6726 kg/ha/yr or 3 tons per acre per year (TAY)) 
or the national goal of 5 TAY (11210 kg/ha/yr) because they incorporate 
the relatively more erosive crop, soybeans, in the rotation. While higher 
levels of risk aversion induce a shift from conventional to reduced 
tillage, conserving both soil and moisture and offsetting the increase in 
soil loss, the levels of soil loss remain far above tolerance levels. 
6 These results may overstate the amount of diversification a single farmer would 
choose, because of the additional managerial expertise, machinery tooling requirements, 
and machinery transportation logistics required for each system. New systems might 
require some minimal acreage before they would become practical. At the regional level, 
however, production changes in the stated proportions are plausible. 
7 A level of 0.0001 means that marginal utility decreases at a rate of .01 percent per 
dollar increase in returns, and the farmer is said to be risk averse because s/he derives less 
additional satisfaction from an additional dollar of income. 174 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
Table 1 
Land Availability Constraint Only 
Risk  Expect- Pesticide 
Aversion  Soil eel Net  Loadings  Management Systems 
Level  Loss Income  Air SW GW X5  X6 X7 X9 X13 X14 X15 X21 
mg/ha 
WhüHr) ('87$)  kn/ha  Hectares 
0.00000  31164 53888 26.0 18.7 23.8 60.7  28.7 32.0 
0.00030  34078 51976 23.4 20.0 11.0 84.8  3.6 33.0 
0.00050  32733 50851 23.1 19.1 11.9 77.8  43.5 
0.00065  32061 50033 23.1 18.4 13.4 71.5  49.9 
0.00100 31164 48162 23.2 17.7 15.4 64.1 57.2 
0.00200 28249 43082 23.2 17.4 16.1 47.8 10.4 3.2 49.8 4.5 2.2 3.6 
Note: The following notational shorthand is used in Tables 2, 3 and 4 to depict the 
management systems: "rotation-tillage method-control practice". 
Air  —  Volatilized  where CC  =  Continuous corn rotation 
SW  Surface runoff  CS  Corn, soybean rotation 
GW  =  Leached  CT  Conventional tillage 
X5  =  CS-CT-VT  RT  Reduced tillage 
X6  =  CS-CT-CN  NT  •  No-till 
X7  =  CS-CT-CNTR  VT  =  Vertical plowing 
X9  =  CC-RT-VT  ST  Stripcropping 
X13  CS-RT-VT  CN  Contouring 
X14  =  CS-RT-CN  CNTR  Contouring and terracing 
X15  =  CS-RT-ST 
X17  CC-NT-VT 
X21  —  CS-NT-VT 
X22  —  CS-NT-CN 
X23  CS-NT-ST 
The shift to corn-soybeans produces an overall decrease in pes-
ticide loadings, particularly to volatilization (air), because soybeans are 
less chemical intensive than corn. In addition, we observed a tradeoff 
between potential pesticide loadings to surface runoff and those leached 
below the root zone. Higher levels of soil erosion produced greater 
surface runoff of pesticides and less leaching, and conversely. Soil 
conserving practices (e.g., no-till) prolong the retention for water in the 
field and may enhance percolation and leaching of pesticides, depend-
ing on their mobility and persistence properties. REDUCING ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION 175 
3.2. Simulation Two: Land and Soil Loss Constraints 
In the second simulation, we added a stochastic soil loss constraint, with 
a restriction of 5 TAY on soil loss, to capture the effect of soil loss 
variability on the selection of management systems and hence net in-
come. Table 2 presents the results. We began with a probability of 
meeting the soil loss constraint half the time (50%). for a risk neutral 
decision maker (O = 0.0). Not surprisingly, the land under more erosive 
management systems with conventional tillage (e.g., CS-CT-VT) declines, 
and that under systems with reduced or no-till increases. The cost of this 
soil restriction is notably low. Soil loss declines by about 71% at a cost 
of about $1900 in lost expected net income to the farmer ($6 per acre or 
$16 per hectare). To satisfy this constraint, 5 out of 6 hectares (12 out of 
14 acres) of the most erodible land dropped out of production. Poten-
tial pesticide leaching losses increased with the reduction in soil 
erosion because of increased water retention in the field due to soil 
conservation practices. If leaching were less of a concern, significant 
reductions in soil erosion and pesticide runoff could be achieved at a 
relatively low cost. 
Our analysis of input risk differs from that of Kramer et al. 
(1983) in that we separately consider the farmers attitudes toward risk 
in income and inputs, the latter of which is simply soil loss in our case. 
These two sources of risk can have different effects upon expected 
income and enterprise diversification. As we did for O, in the objective 
function, we selected a wide range of values for D here to represent a 
broad range of possible farmer attitudes. Surprisingly, whether the prob-
ability of meeting the constraint was 50% to 80%, 90%, and 95% 
mattered little, (see Table 2). Aversion to randomness in soil loss had no 
significant effect on expected net returns, in contrast to the enterprise 
diversification induced by the farmer's aversion toward income risk. We 
suspect this unusual finding follows from our consideration of farmer 
attitudes toward risk in soil loss separate from risk in income; if so, 
farmers' risk attitudes toward income variability and erosion differ. 
Income in any year is clearly important, but for soil loss, the total over 
the 25-year planning horizon is all that matters. Our finding is sig-
nificant because if stochastic variation in soil loss does not influence 
management system choice, then it cannot be used to defend subsidies 
for soil conservation. Our result differs from Prato (1991), for example. 176 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
He finds that stochastic variation in soil loss has had a significant effect 
on the economic feasibility of switching from conventional to minimum 
or no tillage in Idaho. 
Table 2 
Land Availability and Soil Loss Constraints
 8 
Risk Expected 
Aversion Net Management Systems 
Level  Income  X5  X6  X7 X9 XI3  X14  X15  X17  X21  X22  X23 
C87$)  Hectares 
D = 0 (50% reliability) 
0.00000  51971  37.2  28.7 26.3  11.7  12.7 
0.00030  49860  37.2  15.1 37.2  14.4  12.7 
0.00050  48691  37.0  6.8 42.0  18.1  12.1  0.6 
0.00065  47873  34.8  0.6  3.5 43.7  2.1  18.8  10.4  2.3 
0.00100  46078  31.9  2.9  44.6  4.5  20.1  8.4  4.3 
0.00200  41233  26.1  7.6  2.8 34.6  8.7  3.9  19.1  6.6  7.0 
D  = 0.85 (80% reliability) 
0.00000  51928  37.2  28.7 26.3  0.3  9.8  14.3 
0.00030  49794  37.2  14.8 36.3  0.3  13.8  14.3 
0.00050  48630  37.0  6.8 41.0  0.3  0.3  17.2  13.4  1.9 
0.00065  47814  34.4  0.6  3.5 43.5  2.4  0.2  17.8  10.9  3.4 
0.00100  46020  31.5  3.0  44.4  4.7  0.2  18.7  9.1  5.1 
0.00200  41 180  25.8  7.6  2.8 34.6  8.9  4.0  0.2  18.0  7.4  7.9 
D  = 1.29{90% reliability) 
0.00000  51908  37.2  28.7 26.3  0.3  9.1  15.1 
0.00030  49761  37.2  14.6 35.9  0.3  13.7  15.1 
0.00050  48600  37.0  6.7 40.4  0.5  0.3  16.8  12.5 
0.00065  47785  34.2  0.7  3.6 43.3  2.5  0.3  17.1  11.1  3.8 
0.00100  45992  31.3  3.0  44.8  4.8  0.2  18.1  9.4  5.5 
0.00200  41152  25.6  7.6  2.8 34.5  8.9  4.0  0.2  17.2  7.7  8.3 
D  = 1.65 (95% reliability) 
0.00000  51892  37.2  28.7 26.3  0.3  8.5  15.7 
0.00030  49734  37.2  14.4 35.5  0.3  13.6  15.7 
0.00050  48575  37.0  6.6 40.0  0.7  0.3  16.5  12.6  2.9 
0.00065  47762  34.0  0.7  3.6 43.3  2.7  0.3  16.7  11.3  4.2 
0.00100  45968  31.1  3.0  44.3  4.9  0.3  17.6  9.6  5.8 
0.00200  41129  25.5  7.6  2.8 34.5  8.9  4.0  0.2  15.9  8.0  8.6 
8 Soil loss, Air, SW, and GW values are not reported in this table because they vary 
little as D changes. The ranges for their values in these simulations are Soil Loss: 8743.8 
- 9416.4, Air: 22.2 - 25.1, SW: 13.6 - 15.5, and GW: 21.4 - 28.8. REDUCING ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION  177 
3.3. Simulation Three: Land, Soil Loss, and Pesticide Constraints 
In the third simulation we added constraint (4), which limits pesticide 
loading below the root zone and controls for possible surface water 
runoff and air volatilization effects. Constraint (4) held total potential 
pesticide loadings to air and surface runoff at levels achievable without 
the soil loss constraint, since soil conservation can exacerbate these, 
while requiring that loadings leached below the root zone to be reduced 
by 20%. The 20% figure is somewhat arbitrary; we wanted a reduction 
that would provide a clear environmental improvement but would be 
small enough to minimize economic effects. Empirical documentation of 
economic thresholds, where environmental improvements might come at 
minimal economic cost, unfortunately is not well developed (Fox etal, 
1991, make this point in their literature review). Also, we investigated 
this pesticide loadings constraint only simultaneously with the soil loss 
constraint. In view of the erosion control efforts of past half century, it is 
only realistic to evaluate any pesticide control measures in conjunction 
with soil conservation efforts. 
Table 3 presents the results of the third simulation, and a com-
parison with Table 2 reveals some surprising results. The strict improve-
ment in leaching losses costs the farmer about $50 to $600 in expected 
net income, depending upon the level of risk aversion. At the lower 
levels of risk aversion, the income loss is greater primarily because 
of the smaller number of management systems. The loss ranges from 
$0.41 to about $5 per hectare ($0.17 to about $2 per acre). Also, total 
Table 3 






Income  X5  X6  X7 
Managementsystems 
X9 X13 X14 X15  X21  X22  X23 
C87$)  Hectares 
0.00000  51350  37.2  17.0  8.2  26.3  15.3  12.7 
0.00030  49676  37.2  12.2  3.5  32.8  18.0  12.7 
0.00050  48611  37.3  9.6  1.0  36.6  19.5  12.1  0.7 
0.00065  47825  38.1  7.7  36.4  1.4  20.6  10.4  2.3 
0.00100  46025  35.2  10.3  0.4  34.8  3.3  20.0  8.4  4.3 
0.00200  41181  27.2  11.8  6.8  27.8  7.9 2.9  18.5  6.6  7.1 178 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
erosion increased slightly but is well below the specified limit. The 
farmer drops management systems such as CC-RT-VT that increased 
leaching losses in favor of those systems (e.g., CS-CT-CN) that prevent or 
reduce leaching. 
3.4. Simulation Four: Land, Soil Loss, and Loadings of Individual 
Pesticides 
The third simulation constrained total pesticide loadings, as measured by 
active ingredient. The fourth simulation disaggregated the effects of 
different pesticides in order to allow for chemical input substitution 
possibilities. This required the use in our QP of pesticide loading coeffi-
cients disaggregated by individual pesticide (Donigian et al, 1986). 
The farmer chooses pesticides and management systems separately but 
must use a fixed amount of a given pesticide with a particular system. 
The salient results appear in Tables 4 and 5, with a complete listing of the 
pesticides considered appearing in Table 5. 
Table 4 
Land Availability, Soil Loss, and Specific Pesticide 
Loadings Constraints 
Risk  Expected 
Aversion  Net  Management Systems 
Level  Income  X5  X6  X7  X9 XI3 X14 X15 X17  X21  X22  X23 
CS7$)  Hectares 
Status quo 
0.00000  49407  63.3  22.1  0.3  18.3  \in 
0.00030  47851  63.3  21.5  0.6  0.3  18.3  12.7 
0.00050  46824  63.1  17.5  4.7  0.4  17.8  12.2  0.8 
0.00065  46064  62.9  16.3  6.1  1.6  16.7  11.0  2.9 
0.00100  44321  57.9  19.5  8.0  1.2  14.1  9.5  6.5 
0.00200  39621  44.4  25.3  15.6  1.7  11.7  7.8  10.2 
Atrazine Ban 
0.00000  48010  63.3  22.1  0.3  18.3  12.7 
0.00030  46453  63.3  21.5  0.6  0.3  18.3  12.7 
0.00050  45427  63.1  17.5  4.7  0.4  17.8  12.2  0.8 
0.00065  44666  62.9  16.3  6.1  1.6  16.7  11.0  2.9 
0.00100  42923  57.9  19.5  8.0  1.2  14.1  9.5  •6.5 
0.00200  38223  44.4  25.3  15.6  1.7  11.7  7.8  10.2 REDUCING ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION 179 
Table 5 
Pesticide Loadings to Volatilization, Runoff and Leaching
9 
ATZN CYZN SMZN ALCR MCLR LNRN MTZN BTZN TFOS 
(Air, sw in KG/HA/YR of active ingredient; ow in MC/UA/YR) 
Status quo 
Air  1.39  1.22  5.78  6.90 3.0 0.58  0.0  0.98  4.14 
SW  2.0  0.4  8.7  7.4 4.3  0.3  0.0  1.0  1.8 
GW  0.3  0.0  447.0  0.0 1867.1 
ATZN ban "' 
0.0  0.0  0.0  8 800.1 
Air  0.0  0.0  8.10  6.90 3.00  0.58  0.0  0.98  4.14 
SW  0.0  0.0  9.9  7.4 4.3  0.3  0.0  1.0  1.8 
GW  0.0  0.0  2 641.4  0.0 1 867.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  8 800.1 
Where: 
ATZN = atrazine 
CYZN = cyanazine 
SMZN = simazine 
ALCR = alachlor 
MCLR = metolachlor 
LNRN = linuron 
MTZN = metribuzin 
BTZN = bentazon 
TFOS = terbufos 
Note: GW loadings are expressed in smaller units than sw or AIR. While they may 
appear larger, GW loadings are actually smaller than AIR or sw loadings. 
3.5. Status Quo: Analogue of Our Total Pesticide Constraint 
The pesticide constraints included in the "Status quo" scenario, as before, 
held total potential pesticide loadings to volatilization and surface runoff 
at levels achievable without the soil loss constraint, while requiring 
residues leached below the root zone to be reduced by 20%. Overall results 
differ, though, because here we imposed a much stronger restriction, i.e., 
on individual, rather than total, pesticide loadings. We did so to set up 
a basis for comparison with our atrazine ban scenario below, to show the 
importance of substitution between pesticides. The restriction on in-
9 Cyanazine and simazine are substitutes for atrazine; metolachlor is a substitute for 
alachlor: and metribuzin and bentazon are substitutes for linuron. Terbufos has no substi-
tute in the model. 
11
1
 Cyanazine use disappears with the ban of atrazine because it was necessary to 
remove the limit on simazine loadings below the root zone to get a feasible solution. 
Banning one herbicide in the model necessitates allowing increased use of its substitutes. 180 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
dividual pesticide losses causes expected income to fall by about 4% 
in comparison with the Table 1 results and slows down the implementa-
tion of conservation tillage to meet the soil loss limits. Also, the manage-
ment system using chemicals most intensively (CC-RT-VT) drops from the 
optimal plan. 
3.6. Atrazine Ban 
In the second scenario, we ban atrazine, a suspected cause of cancer; 
congestion of the heart, lungs, and kidneys; hypertension; muscle 
spasms; anorexia; and degradation of the adrenal gland (USEPA, 1991). 
Atrazine is the most widely used pesticide in U.S. corn production, the 
most frequently detected pesticide in groundwater in most of the 
midwestern U.S., and is ubiquitous in surface watersheds where ap-
plied (USEPA, 1992). The Safe Drinking Water Act requires that public 
utilities treat water for atrazine if it is found in amounts greater than 
standards established by USEPA. Installing advanced treatment systems 
to remove atrazine could result in substantial costs to utilities and their 
customers. Alternatives to treatment focus on controlling atrazine 
applications, thereby preventing or limiting its discharge into surface and 
ground waters. An atrazine ban is the most extreme form of this ap-
proach. 
Before looking at these results, however, the modeling of this ban 
warrants discussion. To get a feasible solution, it was necessary to 
remove the restriction on simazine loadings below the root zone. Thus, 
unlike the other results in this paper, those reported in the next para-
graph do not hold simazine leaching below the root zone to levels 
achievable in the first set of simulations, before imposition of the soil 
loss constraint. That simply is not possible here: if we are to ban one 
herbicide, then we must allow increased use of substitutes. Relaxing 
this constraint means expressing the cost of the atrazine ban as the sum 
of two effects: foregone income to the farmer and net changes in pes-
ticide loadings. 
Income falls another three percent as a result of the atrazine ban. 
The decrease occurs because of diminished yields and higher costs 
associated with the substitute herbicide, simazine (Table 5). Atrazine 
loadings are eliminated (as are those of cyanazine), but those of 
simazine to volatilization, runoff, and leaching below the root zone REDUCING ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION 1 81 
increase by 40, 13, and 491 percent, respectively. The availability of a 
close substitute limited the economic loss to the farmer from the ban of 
this widely used herbicide and in fact eliminated the need to alter 
management systems. However, potential pesticide losses to the en-
vironment increase because of the substitution of less cost effective 
pesticide (e.g., simazine) for atrazine. 
Health and ecosystem protection would be better served if atrazine 
control strategies considered both the target chemical and its substitutes. 
(A recent evaluation of atrazine control strategies, conducted at the 
regional level for the U.S. Midwest, also makes this point. See Ribaudo 
and Bouzaher, 1994.) Atrazine, simazine, and cynazine are all members 
of the triazines group and have similar leachability and toxicity proper-
ties (Gustafson, 1989; Weber, 1977). Thus, little if any environmental 
improvement occurs as a result of the ban. This result suggests a dilem-
ma for regulators since banning several alternatives used for a pest 
problem can produce very large economic impacts (Ribaudo and 
Bouzaher, 1994; Osteen and Kuchler, 1986). If all triazines were to be 
banned, use of newer, sulfonyl herbicides (e.g., nicosulfuron and 
primisulfuron; not in our model) would probably increase, but at a 
greater cost, with a narrower window for effective application, and with 
a greater possibility of accelerated development of weed resistance 
problems. Available evidence on these newer chemicals (approved in 
1990) suggests that they too have leaching potential (USEPA, 1992). 
Herbicide-resistant corn now under development might be a preferred 
alternative since it could promote more use of post-emergent herbicides 
(i.e., applied after plant emerges from soil), rather than triazines, which 
are pre-emergents. Post-emergent herbicides are applied in lower con-
centrations and later in the season; are more biodegradable; and would 
likely produce less leaching and runoff than triazines. 
3.7. A Final Result 
One final result puts our findings in perspective with the state of 
knowledge about farmers' risk attitudes. Figure 1 shows that as the level 
of risk aversion increases, the differences in net income under the various 
scenarios become smaller. This effect occurs for two reasons. First, the 
induced diversification causes portfolios (combinations of management 
systems) to become more alike. Second, diversified portfolios are better 182 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
able to stand the shock of new pesticide bans or restrictions, so the 
additional cost of a restriction is less. Figure 1 also shows the importance 
of using a range of risk aversion settings. The magnitude of diversifica-
tion induced by changing the level of risk aversion is much greater than 
that from the restrictions. Clearly, an omission of income risk from our 
framework would have badly misrepresented farm production decisions, 
and by extension, the effects of environmental protection policies for 
agriculture. Policy makers do well not to neglect the fundamental issue 
of risk bearing. 
Figure 1 
Economic Impact of Soil Loss and Pesticide Loading Restrictions 
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4. Conclusions 
Our aim was to evaluate the effects of alternative pesticide loadings 
restrictions in the presence of ongoing soil conservation efforts. In 
addition to limiting regulatory burden, policy makers also must contend REDUCING ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION 183 
with possibly opposing environmental goals. By assessing the farmer's 
possible response to two types of risk and to resource use restrictions, we 
hoped to gain a clearer picture of the cost of managing a multi-dimen-
sional agro-environmental problem. 
Some of our results were expected and suggest the fundamental 
soundness of our approach; others offer insights on the farmer's 
response to risk and resource use restrictions. With increasing levels of 
risk aversion, the farmer diversified production to reduce variability in 
net income. However, the large size of this effect, compared with any 
from our array of soil loss and pesticide loadings restrictions, is some-
what surprising. In particular, farmer attitudes about income risk induce 
enterprise diversification, while attitudes about soil loss risk appear not 
to matter. Imposition of a soil loss constraint, as expected, caused the 
farmer to shift out of conventional tillage and into systems with reduced 
or no-till, but our changes in the probability of meeting this constraint 
had no significant effect. The farmer is concerned with total soil 
loss over the 25-year planning horizon but not with soil loss in 
any given year. This finding may stem from our separate consideration 
of farmers' attitudes toward risk in soil loss and income, and it 
contrasts with the belief, expressed for example in Kramer et al. 
(1983), that the stochastic nature of the soil loss has a large influence on 
crop yields and thus on income. This is an important finding in that 
riskiness in soil loss has been used as a defense for subsidizing soil 
conservation efforts. 
We also examined the effect of pesticide restrictions when soil loss 
constraints are already in place, as they are likely to be for some time. 
We found that a 20% reduction in total leaching losses cost the farmer 
only about $50 to $600 in expected net income ($0.41 to $5 per hectare, 
or $0.17 to $2 per acre), depending upon the level of risk aversion (<D). 
At lower levels of O the farmer diversifies less and the loss in income is 
greater. Management systems changes are the expected response to 
pesticide restrictions in the absence of close substitute; systems causing 
smaller leaching losses replaced ones causing more, but soil erosion 
increased as did pesticide loadings to surface runoff. 
Comparable restrictions when substitute chemicals are available 
are likely to cause smaller economic but larger environmental ef-
fects. A complete ban on the use of atrazine, on the other hand, 
caused bigger effects of both sorts. Farm income fell $1400 because of 184 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
the yield loss and higher production costs associated with the sub-
stitute herbicide, simazine. In addition, air volatilization, surface 
water runoff, and leaching losses from simazine increased by 40, 13, 
and 491 percent, respectively. A complete ban of a selected chemical 
may not achieve the desired goals because farmers will switch to 
substitutes. 
Limitations of this research point to directions for further work. 
First, because we limit only total pesticide and sediment loadings for the 
farm, it is possible that per hectare contamination could pose a problem 
at particular locations in the farm and surrounding areas. Ours is a farm 
level model and does not consider these important issues. Second, com-
modity programs that require farmers to maintain a base acreage might 
hinder the diversification of management systems that occurs in our 
model, increasing the burden of the resource use restrictions. Uncertain-
ty over the future forms of commodity programs would complicate 
efforts to include them. Also, realistic constraints on the availability of 
labor, machinery, or managerial skill would have the same effect. Third, 
we use historical variance in income as a measure of the farmer's risk 
rather than a field estimate that might come closer to his/her own 
subjective assessment. Fourth, pesticide loadings are stochastic in na-
ture but deterministic in our model. Since the levels of pest infestations 
and rainfall vary and because pesticides are a risk-reducing input, pes-
ticide loadings ideally should be incorporated in the model as stochastic 
rather than deterministic factors. Doing so would offset our result that 
pesticide applications and income risk aversion are inversely related 
(see Table 1). Unfortunately the data to do so—covariance matrices 
for pesticide loadings to environmental media for each of the pes-
ticides—do not exist to our knowledge. In any case, the invariance of 
our results to changes in the soil loss risk parameter D suggests that 
the use of a stochastic soil loss constraint with a deterministic pes-
ticide loadings constraint did not produce misleading results. Lastly, 
more research is needed to systematically measure the distribution 
and evolution of farmer risk preferences if research of this type is to 
be truly useful to policy makers. These limitations of our research 
stem from simplifying assumptions in an already complicated 
modeling effort and do not reduce the value of our findings as broad 
insights. REDUCING ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION 1 85 
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